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Abstract
The paper addresses the shift from a moderate innovation policy to a more radical one,
aimed at radical transformations of existing structures, such as accelerating innovation
to address grand societal challenges or to modernize a traditional sector. In this paper,
we propose an analytical framework based on the identification of three constitutive
rationales of policy intervention in the domain of innovation. This approach introduces
the distinction between moderate and stronger modes of intervention. Stronger modes
are characterised by a higher degree of intentionality, centralization and focus. The last
part of the paper is devoted to certain principles of policy design under which the risks
of such a shift can be minimized and positive effects can be maximized.
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1 Introduction
This article begins with the assumption that certain innovation policy goals – such as
accelerating innovation to address grand societal challenges or to modernize a tradi-
tional sector – imply a change in the degree and nature of innovation and research
policies that have dominated the policy landscape in the past thirty years. These policies
have been characterized by a moderate degree of interventions and neutral logics of
resource allocation – in other words, such policies have deployed programs and
instruments to support innovation without any pre-determination of the domains,
sectors or technologies where these instruments should be used. Our assumption is
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that such types of innovation policy are insufficient in supporting more radical trans-
formations, such as the modernization of an old industry or the acceleration of
innovation to solve certain grand societal problems. It is thus necessary for policy to
shift to a higher level of intervention, characterized by a higher degree of intentionality
and prioritization. However, such a shift is full of risks. Adopting non-neutral logics of
resource allocation, which implies preferential intervention, would result in much
higher responsibilities for the government. Moreover, such a shift would open Pan-
dora’s box, with all of the ensuing problems that economists fear.
The current paper addresses this shift from a moderate innovation policy to a more
radical policy, aimed at radical transformations of existing structures. Furthermore, it
explains the conditions under which the risks of such a shift can be minimized, and
positive effects can be maximized.
Our first section proposes an analytical framework based on the pragmatic use of
market failure and other imperfections regarding R&D and innovation. This pragmatic
or eclectic approach allows us to recognize the helpfulness of certain results of the
economic analysis that are integrated within our framework, even if they stem from
distinctive theoretical bodies. This allows us to identify three constitutive rationales of
policy intervention in the domain of innovation. We can distinguish then in Section 2
between moderate and stronger modes of intervention based on the types of problems
addressed (market failure, coordination needs, directionality). Sections 3 and 4 are
devoted to certain principles of policy design that we consider as useful in minimizing
the risks of a non-neutral innovation policy that is, a policy aimed at accelerating
innovation in a particular field or technology.
2 An eclectic approach to building innovation policy rationales
We plead the case for a certain disconnection between the theoretical frameworks
of the economics of innovation and innovation policy concepts that can be
developed by economists. We thus resort to a certain form of eclecticism as
supported by Kindleberger in his famous dialogue with Pasinetti. Eclecticism, he
told us, is absolutely acceptable when it is not used at the theory level but at the
applied economics level. It then becomes a source of richness, as it allows a
combination of results originating from different theories without having to worry
about the coherence of concepts at the theoretical level. Questions of innovation
policy are by definition a case where eclecticism becomes an advantage. Each
theory has produced important results for defining pertinent innovation policies.
The notion of market failures originating from the general equilibrium theory is a
good illustration of this, as is the crucial importance of institutions, their origin
and their evolution that originates from the evolutionary theory or problems of
lock-in and path-dependency that result from this hybrid combination of neoclas-
sical microeconomics and the evolutionary theory. Each of these results is worth-
while for its intrinsic value with a view to elaborating an innovation policy and we
must therefore examine their contribution to the understanding of certain innova-
tion problems, without any obligation to take on board all the theory that goes
with it that may be in contradiction with another theory that has produced other
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interesting results. Thus the idea of eclecticism as a source of richness and the idea
of a certain disconnection between theory and policy concept.
Winter does not write anything different when he acknowledges the interest and
value of the neoclassical concept of market failure with the aim of elaborating an
innovation policy. Of course, at a theoretical level, the concept of market failure is
linked to the formal theory of general competitive equilibrium; it comprises the
framework of optimizing actors, competition, general equilibrium and its counterpart,
the theory of market failure.
But as Winter explains, his point here is not theoretical; rather, it is to recognize that
the language and theory of market failure are valuable for building a strong case for
innovation policy and communicating it to policymakers, as well as colleagues from
other disciplines. The goal is then to impart a balanced perspective of market failure
and use it for cases that can satisfy three criteria (Winter 2017):
– The mechanism generating the core market failure problem is relatively simple and
transparent;
– The nature of the harm is fairly clear; and
– There is relevant experience with using non-market organizational arrangements to
address the problem.
Then, based on these arguments – from Kindleberger to Winter – we can adopt a
principle for the identification and selection of policy rationales that does not strongly
depend upon theory but on the eclectic or pragmatic approach as described above. In so
doing, we can assume that some standard market failures are important to consider
because it is obvious that they satisfy these three criteria. This is the case, for instance,
of so-called “knowledge spillovers” or positive knowledge externalities.1
Our framework for identifying policy rationales and subsequently building a typol-
ogy of policy levels is thus not theoretically very ambitious. It is limited to: i)
recognizing the helpfulness of certain results of the economic analysis that are useful
for elaborating policy rationales and “relieving” them of their “theoretical weight” as it
were in order to be able to use them without being restricted by the theories on which
they are based, and ii) using a list of pragmatic criteria to select the “serious” policy
rationales that can or must trigger an intervention in innovation policy.
On this basis, we identify three constitutive rationales of policy intervention in the
domain of innovation.
2.1 Standard market failures regarding R&D and innovation
In the domain of innovation, it is obvious that knowledge spillovers, as well as
acute risk and moral hazard in financing R&D, and possibly also adoption
1 On the contrary, the case of increasing returns to adoption leading to sub-optimal outcomes and lock-in is
weaker in terms of using it to build a policy rationale. While the whole mechanism leading to potential
inefficiencies (such as in the QWERTY case of Paul David) is correct, as Arrow (1995) writes, “it’s hard to
believe that you are losing a great deal. Well, it would be very interesting to see whether you could find an
example where the result of this dynamic led to a great inefficiency .. the theory is pretty good, the empirical
evidence may be by definition hard to come by, not just a practical question”. The nature of the harm is rather
unclear.
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externalities, are cases of market failure that satisfy the three criteria. For instance,
the whole geographically mediated patent citation literature has built an extensive
base of evidence regarding the existence of knowledge spillovers (see, for instance
and among many Jaffe 1989; Jaffe et al. 1993; Audrestch and Feldman 1996); the
mechanism and effect of this market failure are clear, given that such spillovers
are derived from the non-excludable and non-rival nature of knowledge. This
creates a gap between private and social returns, resulting in systematic underin-
vestment in R&D, which is likely to be detrimental to innovation and productivity
growth. Additionally, there is relevant experience in non-market organizational
arrangements to address such a problem. This experience involves, for instance,
the creation of private institutions by the economic agents themselves to capture
the externalities and reduce the gap between social and private returns. This class
of mechanisms is also labelled as “Coasean Institutions” – as Coase developed the
idea that the existence of externalities induces the creation of institutions by the
private agents themselves to correct them (instead of relying on the classical Pigou
and Samuelson solutions).
Therefore, using the concept of knowledge spillovers as a strong case for market
failure, policy goals involve increasing the appropriability of knowledge and innova-
tion (for example, through the establishment of a patent system) or directly addressing
R&D underinvestment (subsidies, tax credits, support of transfer of technology).
2.2 Coordination and collective action needs
Similar to these « standard market failures », one can identify coordination and
collective action needs as a strong policy rationale (Elsner 2012). Here again, a
pragmatic approach invites us to search for cases where the sources of failure are
clear. They can come from the complementarity of investments (each needs the
other to be profitable) or from the difficulty of small entities to join forces in order
collectively to produce some industry-specific public goods. The negative effects
of these failures are also easily identifiable. In many ecosystems of innovation and
entrepreneurship, one important gap to be addressed by policies is the provision of
complementary capabilities (or specific public inputs) upon which most small and
medium companies can draw, even if they have not contributed to their
production. Such complementary capabilities include specialized skills, R&D,
specialized services for innovation, and so forth. As Suzanne Berger (2013)
argues, based on numerous case studies in the US, Germany and China, the lack
of such capabilities can be a real problem in many ecosystems, leading to the
situation of firms that are home alone. The same kind of non-market organiza-
tional arrangement, as in the knowledge spillover case, can apply here to address
coordination problems. They also stem from Coasean solutions, which again
involve the creation of private institutions by the economic agents themselves in
order to solve collective action problems resulting from the provision of specific
public goods. In their article published in 1993, Weder and Grubel identify the
importance of such a mechanism in the innovation systems of two countries
(Japan and Switzerland). In a similar vein, Romer (1993) builds a model of
specific public goods provision, based on a hybrid institutional arrangement that
combines public intervention and a decentralized market process.
D. Foray
2.3 Directionality
The final type of problem that is important to consider could be called “directionality”,
a new term to describe an old and well-recognized problem (Chataway et al. 2017):
innovation does not necessarily happen where it is socially desirable. To some degree,
this is attributable to the failure of mechanisms that would otherwise properly gauge the
intensity of each item forming the array of society’s wants in the way that markets
gauge the intensity of demand for the array of privately consumed commodities. This
thereby generates price signals that stimulate profit-motivated efforts to satisfy those
wants. A quite well-known example of such a failure is provided by observing that
pharmaceutical companies respond to large market demand for new drugs to treat
ulcers and hypertension, rather than investing R&D on improving the availability of
drugs for victims of malaria and other tropical diseases that ravage poor countries
(David and Foray 2002).
While a certain rate of innovation might be found to be sufficient in sustaining
productivity growth in the economy in general, it can appear to be insufficient in some
domains in which accelerating innovation is an imperative for certain reasons (climate
change, health, modernization of an old industry, etc.). The policy goal then is not
merely to address market failure and incentivize innovation in the general economy, but
to do it in a specific way within certain domains or directions.
In 1962, a fundamental book edited by R.R. Nelson set up the research agenda of a
new discipline for decades. This book (Nelson, 1962) was strongly empirical, alternat-
ing with case studies and statistical analyses, while also providing a few theoretical
papers (including the famous paper by Arrow on innovation externalities and uncer-
tainty) and putting evidence-based policy research very high on the agenda of the new
discipline. The title of the book, “The rate and direction of inventive activities”, was
precisely an invitation to think of innovation policy in terms of this dichotomy: rate and
direction. Some policies can address the rate of innovation within the entire economy,
while others need to address both the rate and direction – or, more precisely, the rate in
a certain direction of invention and innovation.
2.4 Types of failure and problem and policy logic
We began this paper by offering a pragmatic vision of market failure because such a
categorization forms the basis of the existing two policy logics. The first category of
“standard market failures” (including essentially knowledge-positive externalities and
risk and moral hazard in financing innovation) provides policymakers with the possi-
bility to limit their actions to neutral interventions. Indeed, these market failures are
generic and apply to any firm in an undifferentiated way. One could, of course, argue
that, in some sectors, the knowledge base has a stronger tacit dimension that adds some
characteristics of natural excludability to the knowledge and thereby limits the impor-
tance of knowledge spillovers; inversely, some sector capacities for reverse engineering
are so strong that potential knowledge spillovers are very important. There are, indeed,
sectoral variations in the potential importance of market failures across sectors, but
economists recognize (in principle) the generality of these market failures in the
economy – which opens the possibility of generalizing the application of policy
instruments within the entire economy (R&D tax credits, R&D subsidies, patents).
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This has positive implications in terms of administration and monitoring costs, as well
as in terms of evaluating the effects of such a neutral treatment.
Conversely, coordination and directionality problems are mostly sector- or
technology-specific by nature, and, therefore, imply non-neutral policies involving
targeted interventions to fix these coordination or direction problems in certain ways.
3 Two levels of innovation policy intervention
From this very simple framework, one can infer two levels of innovation policy
interventions and logics. A moderate level of innovation policy corresponds to neutral
or horizontal programs that aim to increase the rate of innovation in the entire economy.
We will see, however, that there is not a perfect match between neutral versus non
neutral logic and moderate versus higher level of intervention. Some moderate inter-
ventions are indeed non-neutral.
Higher level of policy interventions are aimed at accelerating innovations within
certain targeted domains or technologies. Such policies are essentially sector non-
neutral and are characterized by a higher degree of intentionality, centralization
and prioritization. This is the design of such policies that will be investigated in
the last section.
3.1 Policy level 1 - moderate intervention
At the moderate level of intervention, the main characteristics are neutrality and the
absence of preferential interventions in terms of the technology or sector, thus mini-
mizing the risks of distortion and government failure. A sector-neutral (horizontal)
policy addresses problems that are similar to those of any company and other innova-
tion actors across sectors and fields. Such a moderate policy involves fixing generic
market failure (such as knowledge spillovers), providing generic public goods and
improving general framework conditions. This policy is neutral because the “allocation
of help” is not based on any kind of technology or sector criteria. The only exception is
size, since large companies have plenty of solutions to minimize standard market
failure in the case of R&D and innovation (Cockburn 2004). In other words, small
firms, as well as young innovative companies, may deserve specific support, but such
support is not sector-specific.
Coordination problems are not usually solved at this level of moderate intervention.
Indeed, problems of complementarity and coordination between investments and
resources are mostly specific to particular sectors or technologies, and, as such, require
non-neutral actions (i.e., actions targeted at specific sectors or technologies). Some
generic coordination problems can be addressed at this level, such as the creation of a
national bank for innovation. However, such interventions are actually less about
solving coordination problems than improving the basic framework conditions or
providing generic capacities.
A range of innovation policy instruments can be deployed at level 1, including
R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, funding for the transfer of technology and start-
ups, and refundable loans, as well as an intellectual property rights system and
adoption subsidies. What makes all of these instruments similar in nature, in spite
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of the fact that they offer various mechanisms to fix market failure, is that there is
no a priori determination of who, in which sectors, and for which technology, can
benefit from them.
These instruments are neutral by design, which means that their beneficial properties
(such as low administrative and monitoring costs) are conditional, in that they are used
in a neutral manner. Thinking of an R&D tax credit and using it in a neutral manner
make the phases of implementation, administration and monitoring of the instrument
very easy and at low policy cost. If someone would now like to turn it into a non-
neutral instrumental – for example, a green R&D tax credit – all of the dimensions of
the policy would become much more difficult and costly.
Finally, even at such a level of moderate intervention, one can observe strong
variations across countries in terms of the importance of such policies and the
number of instruments used. This is due to the fact that market failures are not
universal or free floating. The severity of the market failure depends on many
parameters – relative specialization of the economy, the quality of institutions,
cultures and values. One can observe huge variations among countries – for
example, among France, Germany and Switzerland - in terms of the conception
and implementation of a moderate innovation policy.
3.2 Subtelty – The case of non-neutral and moderate policy intervention
In reality, a policy aimed at encouraging innovation is never totally neutral.2 For
example, R&D tax credit – often considered as the panacea of neutral innovation
policies – is actually an intervention in favor of companies doing research. Purely
neutral policies would therefore more accurately be those that do not directly concern
innovation but concern more generally generic capacities and institutions that form the
innovation framework – human capital, functioning of the different factor and product
markets, macroeconomic environment as well as the generic capacities and institutions
that form the essential components of an innovation system (university, intellectual
property, bank, etc.), even if the neutrality of each of these institutions – in other words,
their general validity – is never absolute.
This means that neutrality as a policy principle is not always decisive for
defining a “moderate level of intervention”. We observe many cases of non-
neutral and moderate interventions, such as those aimed at only supporting firms
undertaking R&D (they are non-neutral), without an ex ante determination of
sectors or technologies (they are moderate). In such case, the non-neutral and
moderate policy is limited to influencing the rate of innovation, not the direction,
and will focus on general categories - activities (R&D) or actors (SMEs) –
regardless of their sectoral or technological affiliation. A non-neutral and moder-
ate policy will create some kind of cross section in the innovation system to target
a predefined category – SMEs, firms doing research. There is therefore a class of
non-neutral policies that exclusively target the rate of innovation that are relatively
easy to implement as they focus on the resolution of “standard” problems, the
2 Rodrik (2007) argues: « Horizontal interventions are a limiting case more than a clear-cut alternative to
sectoral policies. In fact, very few interventions are truly horizontal. They almost necessarily favour some
activities, even if the main goal was not to create such discrimination”.
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category of actors targeted is simple to define, the policy instruments are relatively
easy to use and the programme administration costs are relatively low.
3.3 Policy level 2 - higher degree of intervention
Now we can think of situations where the level of moderate intervention (whether neutral
or non- neutral) is not sufficient because there is a directionality problem to be addressed
by the policy. This is typically the case when the economic system – national or regional –
needs to change more radically in order to move toward new fields, industries, and
specializations. This is, of course, the case of the so-called grand challenges, such as
climate change, implying the need to accelerate innovation in certain fields or domains.
Another typical case is a high-tech strategy reflecting the importance for a country to
develop capacities in terms of general-purpose technologies such as ICT because of the
specific properties of such technologies in terms of potential spillovers to the entire
economy (Trajtenberg 2002; Bresnahan 2010). A final case may simply involve the
importance of radically transforming a traditional and mature industry through R&D
and innovation. When one sector needs to change radically toward a new specialization
or to address a large societal problem, this will not happen spontaneously, not even
through some kind of moderate intervention. A moderate policy is not enough, and both
coordination and directionality failures need to be fixed through specific and complex
interventions that target one particular technology or one particular sector.
A significant difference within non-neutral policies between those that target simply a
category of actors or activities (qualified as moderate intervention) and those that focus on
certain technological or other objectives is that the latter inevitably have a systemic
character (David 1993). They must indeed address questions of complementarities be-
tween different types of capacities, coordination between actors and between investments
or the connection between innovation and diffusion. All these problems are only weakly
addressed by a policy that focuses on only one particular category of agent or activity.3
A major contrast between level 1 and level 2 is a higher degree of intentionality,
centralization of policy-making and commitment toward some kinds of new priorities.
Level-2 policies are not sector-neutral. Their raison d’être is preferential intervention in
targeted domains or sectors. This policy seeks to address specific problems for a
specific technology or sector.
This is not a substitute for policy level 1, but rather an additional option that countries
or regions are well advised to activate under certain conditions. Such conditions mainly
deal with two questions: first, to what extent are coordination and directionality failures
perceived as clear sources of potentially serious harm for innovations within a domain
where innovations need to be accelerated? and second, what is the capacity of the
government to establish a policy process for establishing innovation priorities and for
developing an action plan that will minimize the risks and costs of possible failures?
The figure below summarizes the main findings of sections 1 and 2 (Fig. 1).
3 Paul David (1993) distinguishes between the stage model of innovation policy (which tends to characterize
the policies in the central sphere that focus on certain stages or certain actors of the innovation process) and the
systems model of innovation policy that recognizes the importance of questions of complementarity, coordi-
nation and connection between innovation and diffusion and thus characterizes any policy aiming at
accelerating innovation within a predetermined field or sector. More recently, such a system model of policy
is also addressed by Elsner (2012).
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4 The centrality of policy design for level 2 – Type of intervention
Policies involving preferential interventions to accelerate innovations within certain
domains or sectors have been seriously criticized. There are four main critical argu-
ments that are important to consider. All of these sceptical views about these policies
merit attention because they can contribute toward designing a policy process to
minimize the problems identified below.4
The first kind of scepticism involves the classic concern about distortions: “Although
it is certainly true that not everything can be done at once, focusing on selected areas
for large investments to the neglect of the rest of the economy is a highly questionable
strategy”. Krueger (2011) comments here on the works of Justin Yfu Lin, a great
promoter of the new structural economics framework. She would have plausibly
expressed the same objections to any kind of innovation policy involving preferential
interventions. Ann Krueger is part of this large group of economists who theoretically
recognize the existence of market failure (as a necessary counterpart to the formal
theory of general competitive equilibrium), but strongly argue that these market failures
are not sufficiently serious to warrant governmental intervention, and, in particular,
preferential policies that discriminate across activities.
The second kind of scepticism deals with government capabilities to understand and
fix coordination failures that are specific to each sector or technology. As aptly argued
by Matsuyama (1997), “Understanding the basic principles of coordination problems
does not take one very far in the direction of useful, practical conclusions about how to
4 We do not mention here one classic policy problem because this problem is not specific to stronger modes of
policy interventions. This problem regards project selection. The point is to minimize the risk of supporting
projects that would have been undertaken anyway, turning the policy into a simple mechanism of funding
transfers from the public to the private sector, without any additional effect. See Stiglitz and Wallsten (1999).
This problem applies both to moderate and stronger modes of intervention.
Market failures Neutral Moderate level
Non-neutral
Target pre-deﬁned categories of actors.
Stage model of innovaon – R&D, SMEs
Coordinaon problems Non-neutral Higher level
System model of innovaton
Direconality Non-neutral Higher level
Constuve
raonales of
policy
intervenon
Logic of
allocaon
Level of
intervenon
Centrality of
policy design
Fig. 1 Framework of analysis and the two levels of policy intervention
On sector-non-neutral innovation policy: towards new design...
construct technology policy. Understanding the basic problems, one is led to a new but
not simpler set of questions: what activities in what firms are complementary and
need to be coordinated, and in what way? An appropriate choice of policy tools
requires a detailed understanding of the externalities and the innovative comple-
mentarities involved.” This is obviously a relevant comment, but should it be taken as
an argument to stop any policy intervention aimed at addressing specific capabilities
and specific infrastructures in order to accelerate innovation within a specific domain
(Aghion et al. 2009)?
The third sceptical view can be applied to any policy logic – non-neutral and
neutral alike. However, the problem identified is likely to be amplified in the case of
a policy involving preferential interventions. This is Romer’s argument (Romer
2000): it is not enough to increase spending on R&D but what needs to be supported
is the total quantity of inputs that go into R&D and this includes, in particular,
human capital formation. Because the supply curve of specialized human capital is
fixed in the short run, it is important to generate a correct sequencing of policy
programs, addressing respectively the supply of specialized human capital and the
demand for specialized R&D. Whereas this problem of equating human capital with
an increase in the demand for R&D can be attenuated within the framework of a
neutral policy by reallocating jobs between industrial sectors, it will be far more
difficult if the increased demand for R&D caused by the policy concerns a special-
ized domain where innovations need to be accelerated.
The fourth sceptical view is well explained by Rodrik (2013): any pretext given to
the government for setting innovation priorities and establishing strategic targets
increases the risk that the entire policy will become a central planning exercise based
on principal-agent governance, resulting in very poor information flows from the
bottom up. However, to be fair, Rodrik is not using his argument against preferential
intervention, but rather as a way to trigger the search for new policy designs.
Clearly, these four problems are relevant and deserve attention. However, econo-
mists can respond to them in two different ways. Some think that these problems are
important, while the harm created by coordination and directionality failures are not so
clear, which ultimately does not justify implementing a non-neutral policy. By contrast,
other economists recognize the four problems mentioned above, but they also view
coordination and directionality failures as clear sources of potentially serious harm for
innovation within certain domains, and they emphasize how new principles of policy
design can minimize or overcome these four problems.
To conclude this section, it is interesting to propose the following paradox:
although mainstream economists and the international organizations that were
strongly influenced by mainstream views have been sceptical and have recom-
mended not to implement non-neutral policies, these policies have always been
deployed by governments (in particular, those of large countries) under the old
label of mission-oriented policies in domains such as aerospace, defense or
agriculture (see Foray et al. 2012). In a sense, much of the mainstream economic
discourse about economic policymaking has been radically out of step with reality.
It has recommended that certain kinds of policy be avoided, but governments have
not listened to such recommendations and instead have employed massively
preferential intervention practices so as to establish new industries or develop
new technologies. However, because of the mainstream intellectual taboo, very
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little academic policy research has been undertaken on the kind of policy design
necessary to deal with the four problems mentioned above – leaving a sort of no-
research land, which has not helped governments improve their policy practices at
this level of non-neutral intervention.
5 Toward a new design for a level-2 type policy
Responding to these sceptical arguments by formulating a policy design appropriate
for the policy goal of accelerating innovation within a specific domain is crucially
important. However, the literature addressing such a problem is not very well
developed for the reasons mentioned above. There is work that provides certain
indications indirectly by studying the historical cases of mission-oriented policies in
different sectors or countries, from which certain good (and bad) practices can be
deduced. These contributions range from the pioneering works of Freeman and
Nelson on country-level case studies to several sectoral studies (Mazzucato 2011;
Foray et al. 2012; Mowery and Simcoe 2002; Mowery 2012; Wright 2012; Anadon
2012; Henderson and Newell 2010; Jaffe 2011). There are also still a small number
of studies that identify, from an econometric point-of-view, certain success factors
of sectoral industrial policies – for example, the nature of competition in the
targeted sector (Aghion 2016). Additionally, there are also studies dealing with
the design of particular instruments that can possibly be used within the framework
of mission-oriented policies (Kremer and Williams 2009; Murray et al. 2012).
Finally, we must recognize a very significant contribution made by Rodrik and a
few others (Sabel, Hausmann) who have gone furthest in the analysis of appropriate
policy designs, as far as industrial policies in development economics are con-
cerned. This section makes use of the literature, as well as our own observations,
with respect to the design of smart specialization strategies within the framework of
European regional policies to identify important design principles.5
Let’s start with the following policy goal – accelerating innovation in domain X or
sector Y. What needs to be done? What is the main modus operandi that a non-neutral
innovation policy needs to follow? Faced with such a goal – accelerating innovation –
the roadmap seems to be trivial: a public agency will look for projects in the targeted
area; it will support the provision of complementary capabilities and the specific public
inputs that are necessary to innovate, which small companies cannot produce and; it
will help solve coordination problems. However, what does this mean more precisely in
terms of the types and levels of intervention?
5 - Based on a seminal policy paper (Foray et al. 2009), the Smart Specialization Strategies (S3) approach was
integrated into the reformed cohesion policy of the European Union for 2014–2020. Member States and
regions have developed over 120 S3 s, establishing priorities for research and innovation investments for the
2014–2020 period. Throughout this period, more than EUR 40 billion (and more than EUR 65 billion
including national co-financing) allocated to regions through the European Regional Development Fund will
fund these priorities. The impact of the S3 concept has been significant in terms of the design and
implementation of regional smart specialization strategies. This large-scale European experience provides a
unique case study of a new type of industrial policy particularly oriented towards the modernization of
industrial sectors (Foray 2015).
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5.1 Granularity level and the concept of transformative activity
In cases of preferential intervention to accelerate innovations in a targeted field, the
right level at which a policy action plan needs to be deployed is one of intermediate
granularity, finer grained than sectors, but coarser than individual entities. This point is
strongly made by Rodrik (2004): the new “non-neutral innovation policies” are not
about prioritizing a sector, but rather focus on the activity that aims to transform a
sector or establish a new one. Such activities have scale or agglomeration economies.
They exhibit the characteristics of coordination failures, and thus, would fail to develop
in the absence of support.
Transformative activity is a key concept. It is neither an individual project nor a
sector as a whole, but rather a collection of innovation capacities and actions that have
been “extracted “as it were from an existing structure or several structures, to which
extra-regional capacities can be added, that are oriented toward a certain direction of
change (to address a grand challenge or modernize a traditional sector).
A transformative activity concentrates the actions needed – R&D projects,
partnerships, a supply of new specific public goods – to explore a new area of
opportunity. The basic operational mode is not necessarily a collaborative project,
but rather the search for coordination and links between the entities and projects
concerned, which will facilitate spillovers, economies of scope and scale and the
supply of specific public goods and infrastructures to the domain in question. As
such, a transformative activity can serve as a catalyst for collective action by
firms, suppliers and research partners.
5.2 Policy design principles
These principles should guide processes of building and developing a transforming
activity, while minimizing all risks mentioned in Section 3.
5.2.1 Securing specialized human capital supply as demand for specific R&D increases
This principle is formulated to directly resolve Romer’s problem – spending more on
formal R&D may end up inflating wages of R&D personnel and not producing more
innovation – and thus focuses on the correct sequencing of the policy: the formation of
specialized human capital and capabilities should precede, or at least occur at the same
time as, the programs aimed at increasing the demand for R&D in the specialized
domain in question.
5.2.2 Coupling innovation and diffusion
Given that the objective of an activity is to modernize a traditional sector or accelerate
an innovation to address a grand challenge, constructing a transformative activity
should avoid a systematic allocative bias in favor of high-tech innovations, even if
these innovations are related to the traditional sector or to the grand challenge. Policies
aimed at promoting rocket science and high-tech entrepreneurship will hardly have an
impact on traditional sectors or potential user sectors unless another complementary,
i.e., “adoption-oriented” policy, is designed and implemented.
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The point is to develop an integrated vision of a transformative activity that must not
focus only on the high-tech dimension of the structural change sought. The activity
must also integrate actions that allow the adoption of high technology by the sector that
will be a potential user. Let us take the example of modernizing some segments of the
agrifood sector. The transformative activity concerning a certain number of scientific
innovation projects for agriculture must also include actions (adoption, training, man-
agement) that will facilitate the adoption of high technology by the traditional sector.
The point here is to involve the agrifood sector as a huge reservoir of potential adopters
of these new technologies. The goal is therefore twofold: to encourage young innova-
tive firms by equipping their ecosystem with all of the necessary capabilities AND to
address the innovative complementarities between the high-tech industry and tradition-
al sectors. The latter goal involves addressing human capital and capability problems,
fixing adoption externalities, dealing with coordination failures and providing specific
public goods; in other words, it will address many barriers and obstacles to innovation
diffusion in a traditional sector. If this is not done, the activity will remain limited to
start-ups, and it will lose its truly transformative nature.
5.2.3 Deploying different instruments and the Tinbergen assignment theorem
By aiming to accelerate innovation to address a grand challenge or modernize an
industry through the development of “activities”, policymakers might think of a long
list of instruments to intervene on the supply side (science, technologies, human capital,
R&D), on the demand side (procurement, adoption, prices and tax), and on specific
issues such as entrepreneurship, competition or finance. In a sense, there is no limit to
the number of instruments! All components of the innovation system in the targeted
area need, in principle, some support from fundamental science to technologies, R&D,
skills and diffusion. Henderson and Newell (2010) build a framework of policy
instruments to accelerate innovation in energy, which includes a long list of to-do
items from a policy point-of-view. Yet, how can we be sure that supporting the
development of all these capacities will not result in many useless instruments that
are poorly coordinated and ultimately costly? Taking care of everything is likely to
produce an over-elaborate policy. However, omitting some important policy actions can
be detrimental, given that the final performance of the system is likely to be determined
by the ‘weakest link’.
A design principle is essential here, known as the Tinbergen assignment theorem
(Tinbergen 1967), which provides at least first-order guidance on the “number “of
instruments or programs that need to be deployed, according to the goals or targets. The
number of externalities or market failures should determine the number of instruments
(Jaffe et al. 2004). If we take the case of environmental and energy innovation policy,
there is a need for instruments to support R&D and start-ups (because of the knowledge
externalities, as well as capital market imperfections) and instruments to support
technology adoption and training programs in various sectors (because of adoption
and network externalities, as well as training externalities). Coordination failures can
happen at the interface between technology producers and potential users, which would
also need to be fixed through other instruments (for example, a platform of specialized
services to support the transfer of technologies and the provision of complementary
capabilities). Last, but not least, the environmental externality needs to be addressed
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through some kind of carbon tax or other instrument to price emissions. All in all, such
a policy should therefore involve approximately five or six instruments to implement in
a coordinated way. Moreover, because the sceptical argument of Matsuyama is perti-
nent (see Section 3)– how can the government manage such complexity? – the latter
must choose and determine a small number of structural objectives to be supported.
“Doomed to choose “Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) tell us so!
An interesting lesson can be derived from this example for economists engaged in
innovation policy research and analysis. To obtain this sort of first-order guidance about
the deployment of different instruments (number of potential failures), one needs more
than an abstract understanding of innovation externalities. In Acemoglu et al.’s (2009)
famous paper on environmental and innovation policies, the authors tend to highlight
the need for coupling R&D subsidies with carbon prices; however, they simply forget
the other problems and market failures that are likely to impede innovation within the
targeted domain. In particular, they do not recognize the existence of adoption exter-
nalities that need to be fixed if we do not want to see public resources allocated to
research – turning into some knowledge that will never be used in the industry. This
means that the value of pragmatically using the notion of market failure (as argued in
Section 1) is conditional on an accurate and detailed understanding of the conditions
and procedures of innovation within the domain considered. This is only possible when
economists learn and gather the facts about the technologies and innovation them-
selves. This effort is necessary for the economics of innovation policy to go beyond a
very abstract level, and to avoid producing very limited evidence and knowledge for the
practical design and implementation of an innovation policy.
5.2.4 Recognizing the experimental nature of the policy
Non-neutral innovation policies aimed at accelerating innovation to address a grand
challenge or to modernize an industry are necessarily experimental. The actions
undertaken to achieve these objectives are by definition experiments; some will work,
while others will not. We can clearly see the difference in relation to a neutral policy
applying a relatively well-managed instrument, the “treatment effect “of which is
known – for example, an R&D tax credit available to all companies involved in
R&D. We see that the political risk in this case is low. In view of past experiments
and well-managed evaluation methods, we can surmise that this policy will be effective
in most contexts (i.e., it will lead to an increase in research efforts). It is, of course, a
case appreciated by politicians and policymakers! In the case of a non-neutral policy,
where the objective is the acceleration of innovation within a certain sector, the
experiment is much riskier, and the set of programs and actions is a gamble! These
risks imply certain design principles.
The first principle involves the centrality of entrepreneurial discovery, as a conse-
quence of the fact that one cannot apply a principal-agent logic of governance here,
which supposes that the government has sufficient information to construct a plan and
to provide the incentives necessary for firms to carry it out. As concrete R&D activities
and coordination actions advance (projects, partnerships, platforms, training), suc-
cesses, failures and surprises will happen. The centrality of entrepreneurial discovery
in developing an activity stems from the fact that there is initially no complete
knowledge regarding how the process of accelerating innovation in a certain specific
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domain will unfold. According to Sabel (2004), “What if, as I and many others assume,
there are no principals … with the robust and panoramic knowledge needed for this
directive role?” (p.3). We talk about entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner 1997), as this
term comprises a crucial surprise dimension regarding the real possibilities of devel-
opment and the structural effect offered by transformative activities. Integrating the
entrepreneurial discovery concept into an industrial policy design was first achieved by
Hausmann and Rodrik (2002); although Hirschman (1967) earlier proposed the concept
of “a voyage of discovery” as an essential component of non-neutral development
policy. This represents an essential step forward in enabling non-neutral innovation
policies to avoid the tragedy of centralized planning, in other words, reconciling the
logic of strategic choice and priorities with the logic of decentralized and entrepreneur-
ial information and initiatives.
Second, the flexibility of the policy is a requirement. Whatever is learned, thanks to
the entrepreneurial discovery, must exert a retroactive effect on the characteristics of the
programs within each transformative activity, and also on the activities themselves to
modify or possibly discontinue. Moreover, new combinations can emerge at any time
and must be integrated in the form of new priorities. The flexibility of the strategy
imposes control and evaluation mechanisms that are essential for conducting the
strategy. Monitoring is a key element: projects need to be measured in order to
understand performance, the degree of progress, the direction and magnitude of change,
and in order to indicate that some issues warrant further investigation. One key feature
of such indicators is to provide an up-to-the-minute barometer of the activity that can be
used for immediate feedback and adjustment of the policy (Feldman et al. 2014).6
Third is the maximization of spillovers. The social value of the process of entrepre-
neurial discovery is that it informs the entire system about new opportunities, potential
successes and failures; i.e., what are the directions of R&D and innovation that are
likely to generate the desirable structural changes? The maximization of informational
spillovers created by the discovery phase is a key design principle that distinguishes
entrepreneurial discoveries supported by a public policy, as is the case here, from those
made privately within firms, which tend not to disseminate such information.
When the entrepreneurial discovery process is supported by a public policy, it is
critical that the informational value of the process be maximized. The companies that
are supported in joining the entrepreneurial discovery process must accept and conform
to these rules of information and audit. This creates a design issue: the reward for
entrepreneurial discovery should be structured in a way that maximizes spillovers to
other participants and potential entrants in the transformative activity (Rodrik 2004;
Foray et al. 2009).
5.2.5 The general nature of the policy design
This policy, based on such design principles, is neither purely bottom-up (because, at
some point, priorities are chosen by the government) nor totally top-down (because a few
6 Rammer’s recent works provide a good basis for the development of subsidy mechanisms for R&D projects,
allowing certain flexibility in the allocation of resources: instead of one single financing decision, made at the
start of the project, Rammer elaborates a multiple and sequential decision model that allows unsuccessful
projects to be interrupted sooner and to allocate more financing to successful projects (Rammer and Klingebiel
2012).
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design principles, such as the entrepreneurial discovery process, introduce a strong
bottom-up component). It is rather an intermediate process aimed at enhancing entrepre-
neurial coordination within a framework (priority areas) structured by the government.
6 Conclusion
For a long time, governments have developed and implemented non-neutral policies to
accelerate innovation in various domains, which is viewed as strategic, or in various
industries that need more dynamism, modernization or diversification. These non-
neutral policies are necessary because the problems they address – coordination and
directionality problems – require specific and preferential interventions. Therefore, they
imply a determination of the domain(s), where a set of actions aimed at accelerating
innovations will be undertaken.
A certain kind of «economist’s fundamentalism» has tried for a long time to
discourage governments from using this type of non-neutral approach. As a result,
very few academic policy studies dealing with the design of these policies have been
carried out. Thus, governments have been “left to themselves”, so to speak, in
designing and implementing their mission-oriented policies. As a consequence of
creating such a “no research land”, most non-neutral policies from long ago have
turned out to be very much central planning exercises, resulting in very poor informa-
tion flows from the bottom up, as well as programs to support national champions,
while totally ignoring issues as important as self-discovery, flexibility and spillovers.7
Under the triple inspiration of i) historical works on mission-oriented policies
(notably done by Nelson, Rosenberg, Freeman and Mowery, among many others);
ii) the contributions of Rodrik, Hausmann or Sabel on industrial policy and
development economics; and finally iii) the micro-economic analysis of the design
of specific policy instruments used in a non-neutral way (such as prizes), academic
policy research has been developed. This research has also progressed through a
confrontation between theory and practice, as in the case of smart specialization
regional policy in the European Union.
The increased knowledge base on non-neutral innovation policies resulting
from all of these works and contributions now allow us to identify a few policy
design principles that can help provide governments with strategic capacities for
prioritization and focus, which are nurtured by decentralized information and
entrepreneurial activities.
Among these design principles, we have discussed the following:
– The granularity level – between sectors and individual projects – which corresponds
to a collection of capacities, actors and instruments, structured and coordinated toward
a certain direction of structural change in a specific area or technology.
– The consideration of the complementarities between specialized human capital and
demand for specific R&D should help to focus on the correct sequencing of the
7 - Although a few notable successes should be highlighted. See, for instance, National Research Council
(1999) and Mowery and Simcoe (2002) on the success of the US innovation policy in computer, telecom-
munication and Internet.
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policy and to avoid the inefficient outcome of inflating wages of R&D personnel
while not producing more innovation.
– The coupling between innovation and adoption, which implies a policy supporting
not only the high-tech industry and entrepreneurship, but also human capital forma-
tion, management capabilities and technology adoption in potential user sectors.
– The Tinbergen rule, which provides first-order guidance regarding the number and
variety of instruments or programs to be deployed in the considered policy case,
given the number of market failures or externalities that impede the considered
structural change. This rule is only relevant if sufficient empirical knowledge of the
targeted field or technology allows for an accurate identification of the main
failures and limitations.
– Finally, the view of such a policy, as essentially experimental by nature, imposes a
logic of entrepreneurial discovery instead of a principal-agent governance logic as
an essential mechanism generating information about programs and activities in
progress. This, in turn, plays a crucial role in the principles of flexibility, monitor-
ing and maximizing informational spillovers, which are produced by the entrepre-
neurial discovery process.
Last, but not least, and by definition, for any level 2 type of innovation policy
intervention, choices matter! What should be done, in what kinds of domains, and
for what kind of objective?
John Enos wrote very pertinently that it is useful and productive for countries to put
more effort into discovering and choosing priority areas for R&D and innovation (Enos
1995). One key reason for devotingmore effort to specifying what is and what is not likely
to be fruitful priority areas is that the knowledge and experience acquired from discovering
and choosing the right directions for R&D and innovation can be valuable in carrying out
subsequent stages of product/process/market design, production and distribution.
Therefore, the idea is that the process by which priorities and transformative
activities can be identified is not a process by which resources must be economized
or accelerated at all costs. Neither is it a process that should be “confiscated “by the
government, which would proceed to the selection of priorities in isolation from the
most important innovation actors (firms and universities). Rather, it is the process of
learning about the capacities and opportunities specific to the economy that is useful
and productive. As such, it lies at the very heart of any non-neutral innovation policy.
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